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This study examines how organizations construct and manage risk objects as a duality of harm-
benefit within their normal operations. It moves beyond the existing focus on accidents, 
disasters and crisis. We study the risk-transfer processes of 35 insurers where they navigate the 
tension of retaining risk in their insurance portfolio to increase the benefit of making profit and 
transferring risk to reinsurance to reduce the harm of paying claims. We show that 
organizations’ constructions of risk are underpinned by everyday risk management practices 
of centralizing, calculating, and diversifying. Through variation in these practices not all 
organizations seek balance and we, in turn, uncover the sensemaking processes of abstracting 
and localizing that enable organizations to prioritize harm or benefit. This contributes to the 
risk literature by illuminating the co-constitutive relationship between risk sensemaking 
processes and everyday risk management practices. Following the complex linkages involved 
in the construction of risk objects as sources of harm-benefit, our analysis also contributes to 
the literature on dualities. It shows that while immediate trade-offs between harm-benefit 
occur, prioritizing one element of the duality is ultimately a means for attaining the other. Thus, 
while initial imbalance is evident, prioritization can be an enabling approach to navigating 
duality.  
  
                                                 




Organizations produce, evaluate and manage risks (Hardy and Maguire, 2016, Scheytt et al., 
2006). Yet, few studies explore how risk is constructed and managed within organizations 
(Gephart et al., 2009, Maguire and Hardy, 2013), as existing research primarily focuses on 
‘extreme’ organizational sites of accidents and disasters (Brown, 2004, Gephart, 1993, Leveson 
et al., 2009). We need to move beyond extreme cases to study the benefit – not just harm – of 
risk-taking activities (Geppert et al., 2013, Bromiley, 1991) inherent in everyday risk 
management (Power, 2016). How organizations navigate risk-taking and risk-reduction 
activities in their everyday risk management practices is critical to their sustainability and 
avoiding crises in the wider societal systems in which they participate (Palermo et al., 2017, 
Power, 2016). In response, this study explores how organizations construct and manage risk 
objects (Hilgartner, 1992, Maguire and Hardy, 2013, Boholm and Corvellec, 2011) as a duality 
of harm-benefit within their normal operations (Bourrier, 2002, Power, 2014, Power, 2016, 
Palermo et al., 2017). 
Our qualitative examination of risk-transfer in multiple insurance organizations provides a 
theoretically salient context for this study due to the entanglement between harm (potential for 
large scale losses) and benefit (profits accruing from risk-taking) involved in trading risk. To 
manage uncertain losses following large-scale disasters, insurers pay a premium to transfer a 
portion of risk in those portfolios to reinsurers. A study of this risk-transfer process enables a 
nuanced analysis of how the duality of risk is navigated. Namely, protection through risk-
transfer focuses on harm minimisation, yet also reduces the potential benefit as it comes as a 
cost. Increasing benefit by retaining the risk themselves as a source of profit is thus in tension 
with reducing harm by transferring risk to reinsurers. We focus on how insurers navigate the 
duality of harm-benefit.  
We develop a framework that shows how organizations construct and manage risk objects 
as a duality of harm-benefit within their normal operations. We find considerable variation in 
how organizations construct and manage the duality of risk. Surprisingly, not all organizations 
seek to simply balance harm-benefit. Some organizations explicitly prioritize risk-transfer (to 
reduce harm) while others explicitly prioritize risk-retention (to increase benefit). This 
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variation is explained through three risk management practices we found: centralizing, 
calculating, and diversifying practices. In turn, these practices unfold within two distinct 
sensemaking processes about the duality of risk: abstracting and localizing. Drawing on the 
risk-object framework and its focus on how causal links to harm are socially constructed 
(Elliott, 2019, Hilgartner, 1992), our analysis surfaced weak, strong, and outcome links to the 
construction of harm and benefit within these sensemaking processes. In doing so, harm and 
benefit form a unified interdependent whole even as they remain contradictory elements within 
organizations (Putnam et al., 2016). Our analysis explains a complex dualistic relationship, 
whereby constructing and managing risk objects always entails a dynamic entanglement of 
harm and benefit, even where one or the other is prioritized.  
The resultant framework contributes to literature on the social construction of risk within 
organizational theory (e.g. Maguire and Hardy, 2013, Palermo et al., 2017). We move beyond 
the existing focus on disasters and accidents to explain the normal operations through which 
organizations manage risk as a duality. In doing so, we also extend research on sensemaking 
about risk (Gephart, 1993, Weick, 2010), and managing organizational dualities (Putnam et al., 
2016, Farjoun, 2010). 
Theoretical framing  
Organizational risk objects  
This study draws from organizational scholarship showing that risk is socially constructed 
(Gephart et al., 2009, Miller, 2009, Tierney, 1999). We build on the ‘risk objects’ concept 
(Hilgartner, 1992, Maguire and Hardy, 2013); an explicitly organizational framework that 
focuses analytically on the practices within organizations. In doing so, we shift attention from 
culture and society (e.g. Beck, 1992, Douglas, 1986, Giddens, 1999, Tsoukas, 1999) and 
individual-level cognition and decision making (e.g. Stein, 2000, Holt, 2004, Mitchell, 1995) 
in relation to risk, to focus on the less studied aspects of organizational work and interaction 
(Power, 2014, Power, 2016).  
The risk object framework examines how objects are constructed as risky through processes 
of social construction that causally link them to specific harms (Maguire and Hardy, 2013, 
Samsonova-Taddei and Humphrey, 2015). The dominant focus within organizational research 
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has been on the construction of risk through managerial sensemaking and perception (e.g. 
Gephart, 1993, Roberts et al., 2007, Weick, 2010, Winch and Maytorena, 2009). Such research 
has explored how sensemaking breakdowns cause accidents (Weick, 2010, Weick and Roberts, 
1993) and sensemaking processes post-disasters (Topal, 2009, Gephart, 1993). For example, 
in high reliability organizations that avoid such harmful disasters and crises, sensemaking 
involves collective mindfulness that orientates actors towards preoccupation with failure and 
sensitivity to operations to avoid harm (Weick et al., 2008, Weick and Roberts, 1993). These 
studies have shown how risk sensemaking unfolds in the actions of organizational actors as 
they react or fail to react to events. Other related studies have shown the role of discursive work 
in sensemaking about managing risk (Brown, 2000, Malenfant, 2009). For instance, Brown’s 
(2004: 95) study of the public inquiry following a disaster shows that public discourse can 
concoct “myths that emphasize our omnipotence and capacity to control”. Maguire and Hardy 
(2013) further explore the discursive work involved in stabilizing and destabilizing dominant 
meanings associated with risk objects.  
The focus of this literature has been on the social construction of risk as harmful or not, 
predominantly in relation to disaster and accident; a focus with a long-lineage in organizational 
research about risk (Turner, 1976, Perrow, 1984). Namely, organizational  studies of risk share 
“a tendency to gravitate, with a few exceptions, towards […] dramas or disaster” (Power, 2014: 
378; e.g. Gephart, 1993, Gephart, 1997, Roberts et al., 2007, Brown, 2004, Leveson et al., 
2009, Lounsbury and Hirsch, 2010, Stein, 2000). This dominance has prompted calls to 
uncover the construction of risk objects as a source of benefit not only harm, particularly within 
the normal operations of organizations (Bourrier, 2002, Power, 2014, Power, 2016, Palermo et 
al., 2017) that highlight the ‘continuity of organizational activities’ rather than instability and 
change (Maguire and Hardy, 2013: 240). 
The social construction of risk objects is entangled with efforts to control them (Maguire 
and Hardy, 2013, Hilgartner, 1992). Controlling risk objects involves organizational attempts 
to displace ‘harm’ or, at least, weaken the link between a risk object and harm (Hilgartner, 
1992). Here, we use the term managing risk, rather than controlling, to reflect that risk in many 
organizational contexts cannot be fully controlled. The organizational literature on managing 
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risk is preoccupied with calculation. Moving away from the notion of objective calculation of 
risk (e.g. Lupton, 1999, McNamara and Bromiley, 1997, Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) to its 
social construction, it has focused on how calculative practices not only measure but also 
construct risk. In this literature, managing risk is linked with calculation (e.g. Power, 2004, 
Millo and MacKenzie, 2009) as the central “infrastructure of the risk industry” (Ciborra, 2006: 
1339). Such calculative practices are entangled with and reflect other elements beyond metrics, 
such as values and political interests. Indeed, such studies note varied risk management 
approaches and calculative cultures within organizations (Palermo et al., 2017, Mikes, 2009, 
Mikes, 2016, Mikes, 2011). Building on this, we need to delve into the everyday normal 
operation of risk management to expand understanding of organizational risk management 
beyond calculating practices. This will enable management scholars to account for the plurality 
of risk work (Power, 2016) and identify the dynamic and consequential relationships between 
a broader array of organizational practices (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011) involved in 
managing risk. 
Risk as a duality of harm and benefit 
Within organizations, the association with profit-making (Geppert et al., 2013, Delis et al., 
2015) means that risk can signify not only harm but also opportunity (Power, 2009, Maguire 
and Hardy, 2013, Palermo et al., 2017, O'Malley, 2000). For example, the safety literature has 
highlighted the contradiction between protection and production in the organizational accidents 
context, whereby more of one leads to less of the other (Reason, 2000, McLain and Jarrell, 
2007, Reason, 1997). In a rare exception within the management literature, Palermo et al. 
(2017) recognize that risk culture can be defined by both the opportunity logic (benefit) and 
the precaution logic (harm). They show, within a single organizational case, how this 
institutional complexity is translated into an organization’s efforts to reform its risk-taking 
culture.  
We turn to the literature on dualities to further theorize the linkages to harm and benefit 
that are formed in socially constructing risk objects (Hilgartner, 1992). Dualities are two 
interdependent opposites that exist within a unified whole (Putnam et al., 2016, Farjoun, 2010). 
Whereas dualism involves division into ‘separate, paired elements’, duality constructs 
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contradictory elements (such as harm and benefit) as ‘no longer separate or opposed, although 
they remain conceptually distinct’ (Jackson, 1999: 545; also see Costanzo and Di Domenico, 
2015, Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011, Farjoun, 2010). As Putnam et al. (2016) summarize, 
duality involves oppositional elements that, because of their interdependence, exist in complex 
both/and rather than an either/all relationships (Smith and Lewis, 2011). This perspective 
informs our understanding of how linkages are constructed between risk objects and their harm 
or benefit potential, including the way that risk management efforts generate various, often 
unintended, linkages (Brivot et al., 2017, Hilgartner, 1992, Boholm and Corvellec, 2011, 
Elliott, 2019). Such an approach enables insight into the social construction of multiple causal 
linkages to both harm and benefit that unfold within the everyday risk management efforts of 
organizations (Lê & Bednarek, 2017).  
In sum, this study attempts to unpack the multiple linkages between harm and benefit that 
unfold in the varied constructions of a particular risk object. To do so we explore the normal 
operations through which organizations construct risk object as part of the everyday practices 
of managing risk. Drawing on the risk object framework and the notion of organizational 
dualities, we set out to address the following theoretically-informed research question: How 
are risk objects socially constructed within multiple linkages between harm and benefit during 
the everyday risk management practices of organizations?   
Methods 
Research context  
Insurance organizations are a salient empirical context for studying the duality of risk as they 
make profit from trading in risk (Allen and Santomero, 1997, Adams and Jiang, 2017). They 
offer protection to individuals and firms by providing them with insurance policies. These 
policies, collectively, form their insurance portfolio, which is the focal risk object that insurers 
construct and manage as a source of both harm from which they need protection and benefit on 
which they need to capitalize. This portfolio can cumulatively expose insurers to harm: having 
to pay many claims after a catastrophic event, such as an earthquake in Japan, could strip their 
capital reserves. Yet, it also provides insurers with benefit: insurers make a profit when the 
earned premiums outperform the paid claims.  
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This study focuses on the risk-transfer process where decisions about how to navigate this 
complex relationship between harm and benefit are made (Jarzabkowski, Bednarek & Spee, 
2015). Transferring risk from their portfolio to the reinsurance industry is the central way that 
insurers manage their risk object. This involves decisions about how much risk to retain 
themselves and how much to transfer to reinsurers. Transferring some risk from their insurance 
portfolio provides protection from harm: the more risk transferred to reinsurers the more 
protection gained. Yet insures make profit from retaining risk which means the more risk they 
transfer the more potential benefit (profit) they lose since transferring risk comes at a cost as 
insurers pay premiums to reinsurers. This entanglement generates an additional link between 
harm and benefit: paying too much for reinsurance erodes the potential benefit inherent in the 
risk object.   
Research Design  
We purposefully selected a wide range of insurers to imbue organizational variation into our 
research findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). We explored 35 ‘mini’ cases that differed in size and 
geographic scope (Table 1; column 3) and spanned seventeen countries, from more developed 
insurance markets (e.g. United States) to developing ones (e.g. Indonesia). Our purposeful 
sample included the world’s largest global insurers with turnover as high as US$50 billion, as 
well some of the smallest single-territory insurers with a turnover of US$100 million. We 
focused only on their non-life business (e.g. property) in our sampling and discussions.  
[Table-1] 
Consistent with the qualitative data triangulation principles (Yin, 2009, Miles and Huberman, 
1994), we collected data from multiple sources, including 76 transcribed interviews (60-
180min), 39 observations, and 150 documents all pertaining to our firms. Specifically, during 
2011-2012 we conducted interviews with 52 individuals across 35 insurers. As risk-transfer to 
the reinsurance industry is a specific and clearly identifiable role in insurers, we interviewed 
those managers responsible (i.e. reinsurance department head and/or chief reinsurance buyer). 
Where it was relevant to those risk-transfer roles, we interviewed more than one person in these 
organizations. Interviews focused on four areas: risk-transfer overview; organizing risk-
transfer; relationships with reinsurers; and specific practices and activities related to risk-
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transfer. We asked practical questions about how their organization managed risk. In short, 
these interviews focused on organizational approaches to risk rather than individual perceptions 
of risk and risk-transfer.2  
To corroborate this organizational picture, we triangulated through the additional following 
data sources. We conducted 28 triangulating interviews with reinsurers and reinsurance brokers 
about the risk transfer processes of 15 of our 35 insurers. We also conducted 39 observations 
across 22 of our cases. These included risk-transfer meetings between our insurers and their 
reinsurers at their premises or industry conferences; informal insurer-broker interactions (in 
person or via telephone); social dinner events between insurers and reinsurers; and internal 
meetings discussing risk-transfer. Finally, we collected 150 organizational-specific secondary 
documents including annual reports, media articles and internal documents for all our 
organizations (2011-2013).  
To ensure our dataset trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), we thus undertook several 
steps(Yin, 2009, Miles and Huberman, 1994). Interviews targeted the most relevant people vis-
à-vis risk-transfer in each organization. For nearly all our organization we supported these data 
with additional relevant interviewees, from both inside and outside and with observational data. 
Secondary data on all 35 cases was used to complement and validate the findings, building a 
picture of each organization to confirm, clarify, or challenge our emerging coding. Further, our 
data and analysis were complemented through contact with industry, including monthly 
meetings on the emerging findings with insurers, reinsurers and brokers. We also provided 
these organizations with reports on their risk-transfer practices, which we benchmarked against 
the industry. These formed the basis of follow-up meetings and emails with them to confirm 
veracity with their experience in accordance with qualitative principles of verification (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994, Weick, 1989). The dataset is, thus, consistent with others who have 
examined variation through a spread of interviews of individuals in a similar role across a 
sample of organizations (e.g. Lozeau et al., 2002, Stenfors et al., 2007), complemented by other 
                                                 
2 Our approach is consistent with Weick et al’s (2005) organizational sensemaking theorization, which unfolds 
not through the individual cognition or interpretive acts of managers but in the collectively enacted organizational 
practices (e.g. Hutchings, 1995, Maitlis, 2005); and with other studies that have used interviews with managers to 




triangulated interview, observation, and documentary data, to uncover variation in 
organizational dynamics (e.g. Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013) 
Data analysis 
We engaged in several phases of thematic analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994). First, 
sensitizing ourselves to our primary dataset of comparable interview data with participants 
across all our case organizations (Seale, 1999), we identified two distinct approaches: 
emphasizing risk-transfer to protect their business from the harm arising from high claims and 
deemphasizing risk-transfer (emphasizing risk-retention) to capitalize on the benefit (profit) 
and avoid paying too much on reinsurance. We turned to the literature on risk (Palermo et al., 
2017) and organizational dualities (Putnam et al., 2016) and began to theorize this finding as a 
duality of harm and benefit. Drawing upon existing methods for coding variation in the relative 
strength of phenomena in qualitative data (Bailey et al., 2012, Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009), 
we developed a coding system for identifying whether the evidence for capitalisation on the 
benefit versus protection from harm was strong, moderate or weak in individual cases. This 
provided us with the initial contours for a continuum upon which our different organizations 
were clustered (Table 1).  
Second, we searched for patterns across our data to explain the variation, moving from 
structural explanations (see Table 1; Size/Geo)3 to engaging in first-order coding to assess the 
dominant activities related to risk-transfer. Clustering these first-order codes (activities) three 
organizational practices emerged as second-order themes – centralizing, calculating and 
diversifying (detailed in Appendix 1) that explained our observed variation in how 
organizations navigate the harm-benefit duality (Gioia et al., 2013). As these three practices 
varied between organizations, we categorized them for each case as high, moderate, and low, 
using the same methods as our previous coding of relative evidence of phenomena (Bailey et 
al., 2012, Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). Based on the systematic coding of each separate 
excerpt, we then classified each organization’s overall ‘approach’ to each practice.  
                                                 
3 We organized our organizations by size and geographic scope, drawing largely from our secondary data. We 
found these structural features to be only partially explanatory of the dynamic variation. Namely, while there is 
tendency of large/global organizations to prioritize benefit and small/local ones to prioritize harm, many large 
firms were found to prioritize protection from harm and many smaller organizations to prioritize benefit. Such 
contingency explanations did not appear to hold as evident in Table 1.  
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Third, we returned to our continuum to cluster our organizations according to the way 
patterns in these three practices explained their different emphases on protecting from harm 
versus capitalizing on benefit. We found three clusters that allowed us to label organizations 
as Risk-Balancers, Risk-Capitalizers, or Risk-Protectors. As we theorized these patterns, we 
found the risk object framework particularly illuminating for explaining the dynamics involved 
in constructing and managing the insurance portfolio as a risk object within our particular and 
varied organizational practices (Hilgartner, 1992, Power, 2014).  
Fourth, consistent with our research design, to further validate our emerging framework 
and analysis we delved deeper into some of the cases, selecting a spread of ‘Balancers’, 
‘Capitalizers’ and ‘Protectors’. Using the additional interviews and observations about their 
risk transfer process to delve into these select cases for more depth, we reconfirmed our initial 
classification. This additional data and analytical step were not only confirmatory of our initial 
analysis, providing confidence and robustness to our emerging framework; it also helped us to 
build rich vignettes of illustrative cases (Jarzabkowski, Bednarek & Lê, 2014) that became the 
basis for our final analytical step.  
Finally, as we returned and interrogated our analysis in this way, this  prompted a last round 
of interpretation (Wolcott, 1994) to explore how particular constructions of the risk object 
(harm-benefit) were enacted within specific variations of the organizational practices 
(Hilgartner, 1992). We found the processes of abstracting and localizing to be explanatory, 
which we theorized as different ways of making sense of the risk duality (Gephart, 1993, 
Weick, 2010). Exploring these sensemaking processes in greater detail allowed us to take the 
implications of the risk object framework seriously to theorize the construction of three main 
linkages (weak, strong and outcome) to harm and benefit within the specific and varied risk 
object enactments in our different organizational clusters (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011). 
Specifically, within processes of either abstracting or localizing, organizations constructed a 
strong linkage with either benefit or harm respectively, but also formed a weaker linkage with 
the other end of the duality. Yet as they never neglected any part of the duality, these also 
formed an outcome linkage by constructing an interdependent relationship between both 




We first outline the varied harm and benefit constructions of the risk object, in terms of how 
organizations juggle the dual-foci of protecting from harm versus capitalizing on benefit within 
the risk-transfer process (Fig.1; A). We show that this variation is underpinned by how 
organizations manage risk objects (B) through the three organizational risk management 
practices of centralizing (B1), calculating (B2), and diversifying (B3). We also introduce the 
two sensemaking processes (C) about risk - abstracting (i) and localizing (ii) - that both shape 
and are shaped by these practices and construct multiple linkages to harm and benefit that vary 
between organizations. We bring this analysis together within a framework (Fig.1) which we 
present below as a means of navigating the layers of analysis in the findings. 
[Figure-1] 
Constructing the risk object as a duality: Risk juggling along a continuum  
Insurers construct their insurance portfolio, the focal risk object, as simultaneously harmful 
and beneficial. This represents a trade-off as insurers transfer risk to protect from harm and 
retain risk to capitalize on benefit. The more risk is transferred to reinsurers the more protection 
gained and harm reduced, but the more potential profit (benefit) is also transferred away. And 
yet, conversely, the more risk retained the more benefit is capitalized, but also the more 
potential harm is retained. This harm and benefit cannot be separated and are always entangled 
in a complex fashion given that insurers make profit from sources of potential harm. Insurers 
navigated this in different ways (see Table 2).  
[Table-2] 
First, given this inescapable duality, many insurers enacted risk-transfer as a process of 
balancing the harm and benefit inherent in the risk object (insurance portfolio). For them risk-
transfer involved a necessary balance between protection from harm and capitalizing on benefit 
through risk-retention. We called these ten organizations we found in the dataset, Risk 
Balancers (Table 1). Second, surprisingly, rather than balancing, many organizations 
constructed the duality by consistently prioritizing either harm or benefit at the expense of the 
other. Some insurers constructed the risk object as primarily a source of benefit, strengthening 
the link to benefit by retaining as much risk as possible: “maximise return and make sure we 
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minimise the risk-transfer which we think we can easily absorb with our balance sheet 
[retention]” (Org.3, Interview). We labelled the nine such organizations we found in the dataset 
Risk-Capitalizers (Table 2). By contrast, other insurers constructed the risk object as primarily 
a source of the harm of having to pay many claims after a disaster and transferred as much risk 
as possible to reinsurers to maximize protection from that harm: “if I could, I would have 
brought reinsurance [risk-transfer] on everything” (Org.31, Interview). We labelled the 
sixteen organizations we found in the dataset Risk-Protectors (Table 2). 
Regardless of their prioritization, all insurers still recognized and actively navigated both 
ends of the duality. Risk-Capitalizers, while wanting to minimize risk-transfer, still transferred 
the risk that they considered most volatile to gain some protection. Conversely, while Risk-
Protectors transferred a significant portion of their risk, they still retained some as source of 
profit. Thus Risk-Capitalizers still constructed a minimal link to harm (from which they needed 
protection) and Risk-Protectors still constructed a minimal link to benefit (that they needed to 
capitalize on).  
Three organizational practices of managing the risk object 4 
We found three organizational practices [Fig.1, B1-B2-B3] that appeared critical to explaining 
how organizations manage the risk object. Centralizing reflects whether decision making about 
risk-transfer is centralized within the organization versus decentralized to those closest to the 
risk (e.g. individual underwriters or local operating hubs). We identified three activities that 
explain the extent to which centralizing risk-transfer was high, moderate or low in any one 
organization: authorizing (who authorizes risk-transfer), monitoring (how standardized versus 
flexible the risk-transfer process is) and consolidating (whether risk-transfer is consolidated or 
done within multiple separate accounts and profit centres). Calculating concerns technical 
modelling to analyse portfolios and make risk-transfer decisions. Insurers could be high, 
moderate or low on two calculating activities: using models to make risk-transfer decisions 
(e.g. the degree to which models were used as part of decisions) and assessing information/data 
quality (e.g. the confidence expressed in the information underpinning the models). 
                                                 
4 Appendix 1 provides examples of the organizational activities and practices (low, medium, high) for all 
organizational clusters – Risk-Capitalizers, Risk-Balancers and Risk-Protectors (columns 3-5).  
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Diversifying involves spreading uncorrelated types of risks and geographies across a portfolio. 
While some diversification is fundamental to the notion of insurance, its extent varies 
considerably and represents an insurer’s overall strategic approach to risk. Two related 
activities explain whether diversifying is high, moderate or low within particular organizations: 
incorporating diversification benefits in portfolio evaluations and growing diversification.  
Insurers showed varied patterns in the extent to which they were high, moderate, or low on 
these centralizing, calculating and diversifying practices. Risk-Balancers took a flexible 
approach, being moderate or balanced across the three practices as they sought to balance harm 
and benefit. Risk-Capitalizers constructed a strong linkage to benefit by being high in 
centralizing, calculating, and diversifying, whereas Risk-Protectors were low on these practices 
which enabled them to construct a strong linkage to harm (see Appendix 1).  
Interconnections-in-action  
We now show the unfolding interconnections between these practices and risk objects’ varied 
constructions as dualities of harm and benefit through three representative, anonymized, 
vignettes. In particular, we surface two sensemaking processes that construct the risk object 
duality in particular ways and arise from but also prompt the particular risk management 
practices.   
Balancing harm and benefit: Risk-Balancers. The first vignette illustrates how 
organisations balanced the duality of protecting from harm and capitalizing on benefit. 
Retaining more risk increased benefit but also decreased protection from harm, while 
transferring more risk to reinsurers increased protection but also decreased benefit. These 








Vignette 1. Risk-Balancer 
 
This vignette provides a typical example of balancing. First, Risk-Balancers made trade-offs 
within the individual practices. Tony and Sam iterate between decisions regarding risk-transfer 
that are neither centralized at the group level nor fully decentralized to local underwriters 
(moderate centralizing; Paragraph2-3). Similarly, BalancerInc. both modelled extensively and 
simultaneously displayed caution regarding models’ efficacy, using managerial judgement 
when appropriate. Second, Risk-Balancers also make trade-offs between the practices (see 
mixes of low, high and moderate in Table 1; Org.11-12, 17-18). For instance, low centralization 
by giving localized underwriting teams autonomy, but trading this off with high modelling and 
moderate diversifying to give those local, decentralized teams “information to consider 
whether or not we should internalise some of your [reinsurance] purchase” generates 
balancing and avoids over-prioritizing protection (Org.11). In this way, the organizational 
practices shifted according to the portfolio specifics, as when Sam and Tony shifted from high 
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diversifying vis-à-vis windstorm to low diversifying on flood (Paragraph2). Risk-Balancers, 
thus, enacted the organizational risk management practices flexibly and dynamically in specific 
ways to balance risk as a duality of harm-benefit (see Table 1).   
A reinforcing cycle of abstracting: Risk-Capitalizers. The following vignette shows how 
Risk-Capitalizers consistently prioritized risk-retention through being ‘high’ on the 
organizational practices of centralizing, calculating and diversifying. We show how this 
enables them to abstract (i) the harm in their risk object and thus make sense of it as 
‘manageable’.  
Vignette 2. Risk-Capitalizer 
 
This vignette illustrates that Risk-Capitalizers retain as much risk as possible and prioritize 
benefit [A1] via a reinforcing cycle of being high on all practices [B1-3]. Through these 
practices such organizations retain more risk without however increasing the harm they are 
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exposed to and thus the protection they require. First, high centralizing, for instance 
consolidating local profit centres, reinforces their ability to evaluate the diversifying benefits 
of the whole portfolio. In turn, this drive to capture the diversification benefits further 
reinforces the desire to centralize (Paragraph1). Second, high calculating activities, such as 
building models and quality databases, reinforces and enables confidence in the diversification 
evaluations based on those modelled outputs. Simultaneously, understanding the 
diversification benefits inherent in a portfolio is technically complex and therefore reinforces 
the drive for more extensive modelling (Paragraph3). Third, prioritizing highly technical 
modelled data about harm abstracts it from the local operating context, making it transferrable 
to those at the corporate centre and enabling them to make risk-transfer decisions (high 
centralizing). Simultaneously, standardization and consolidation support the complex large 
databases that underpin high modelling (Paragraph4). In sum, capitalizing on benefit by 
retaining more risk, rather than buying more reinsurance, unfolds through reinforcing practices 
of high centralizing, calculating, and diversifying.  
The vignette also shows that this reinforcing pattern constructs the risk object via a 
sensemaking process about risk, which we label abstracting (i). High centralizing, calculating, 
and diversifying practices dissociate the risk object from any specific tangible instance of harm, 
constructing it as abstract and distant. High centralizing constructs the harm inherent in the risk 
object as far away (those making the decision about risk-transfer are not embedded in the 
location of any specific harm); high modelling constructs the risk as numerical and intangible 
(rather than bringing the harm alive as specific tangible catastrophic events); high diversifying 
privileges a consolidated picture of the insurance portfolio (again conceiving harm as 
disassociated from any specific tangible harm, as indicated by CapitalizerInc,’s CEO dismissal 
of one flood event as harmful). Through abstracting, the harm inherent in the risk object is thus 
made sense of as detached from any particular local harm, so enabling benefits of the portfolio 
to be prioritized over protection (see Table 3).  
A reinforcing cycle of localizing: Risk-Protectors. The final vignette shows how Risk-
Protectors consistently prioritize risk-transfer through being ‘low’ on the organisational 
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practices of centralizing, calculating, and diversifying. We show how this enables them to 
localize (ii) the harm in their risk object and thus make sense of it as manageable.  
Vignette 3. Risk-Protector 
 
This mini-vignette illustrates how Risk-Protectors consistently prioritize protection to 
minimize harm within the duality of harm-benefit. Protection from harm [A2] - most simply 
summarized as transferring more risk through buying more reinsurance - unfolds through a 
reinforcing cycle of being low on centralizing [B1], calculating [B2], and diversifying [B3] 
practices. For example, without centralizing calculations about the portfolio diversification 
benefits it is not possible to assemble large calculative databases or use portfolio diversification 
as a protection from harm. Rather, transferring risk to reinsurers is the primary way to decrease 
the harm to which they are exposed. First, believing that the judgement of localized 
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underwriters, who are closest to the risk, should drive decision making about risk-transfer (low 
centralizing) is reinforced by a lack of confidence in models (low calculating). We see this in 
the vignette, where privileging local underwriter knowledge simultaneously explains the de-
prioritization of models and makes the underwriter the key decision maker (Paragraph1-2). 
Second, low diversifying is also entangled with this caution around models. The models 
necessary for evaluating portfolio diversification are not trusted by Risk-Protectors. As the 
vignette shows, in-depth knowledge of a specific local area is instead the foundation for risk-
transfer, rather than technical calculations of diversification benefits (Paragraph4). Third, low 
emphasis on the diversifying benefits of the portfolio means less impetus to centralize.  
The vignette shows that this reinforcing pattern constructs the risk object through a 
sensemaking process about risk which we label localizing (ii). Enactment of the reinforcing 
practices of low centralizing, calculating, and diversifying constructs the harm inherent in the 
risk object as proximate, tangible and multiple (Table 3). Effectively, the distance between the 
harm inherent in the risk object and the organization is reduced, thus prompting a focus on 
protection. First, low centralizing co-locates risk-transfer decisions and the harm inherent in 
the risk object. This is exemplified in the underwriter who most intimately knows the tangible 
harm, as he deals with those buying property insurance in Pakistan, overseeing risk-transfer. 
Two, low calculating involves making the harm inherent in the risk object tangible as part of 
underwriter judgement, rather than considering it in abstract ‘modelled’ terms (Paragraph5). In 
short, bringing the harm ‘alive’ within the specific local context in which the organization is 
similarly embedded. Finally, low diversifying means harm is understood as multiple specific 
harms embedded in the relevant local contexts rather than constructing it in aggregated 
consolidated terms. Through this localizing process, Risk-Protectors, thus, make sense of their 
portfolio as comprising multiple tangible localized harms from which they need protection 
through risk-transfer to reinsurers.  
Constructing linkages between harm and benefit  
Our findings highlight the interrelationship between sensemaking processes about harm-
benefit (Fig.1; C) inherent in the risk objects construction (A) and the organizational practices 
of managing those risk objects (B). Some organizations respond by balancing harm and benefit 
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via a moderate approach to centralizing, calculating, and diversifying. This is a common-sense 
approach that neither overemphasizes risk-taking that can potentially harm the organization, 
nor neglecting it which could discount the opportunity of capitalizing on risk. However, our 
framework (Fig.1) shows that many organizations also prioritize one end of this continuum. 
We now explore this complicated trade-off further. Namely, we illustrate how the complexity 
involved in constructing risk objects leads to new linkages (Hilgartner, 1992) as prioritizing 
harm or benefit involves a trade-off but also, as is the nature and construction of duality 
(Farjoun, 2010), ultimately leads to and involves the other.  
Multiple linkages. We explore the multiple linkages involved in constructing the harm-
benefit duality. First, abstracting constructs three linkages in relation to the risk object. The 
first two linkages form the explicit trade-off between a strong linkage to benefit (via 
maximizing risk-retention) and a weak linkage to harm (via minimizing risk-transfer). 
However, our findings highlight a third outcome linkage that complicates this relationship 
between harm and benefit. Constructing the risk object, via abstracting, as primarily a source 
of benefit is also indirectly a means of focusing on harm. This outcome linkage is reflected in 
Vignette 2 (Paragraph1) where retaining risk is seen as a means of self-protection that 
strengthens the organizations’ fiscal position, with the outcome that their own balance sheets 
can be a source of protection. While a trade-off in benefit over harm appears present initially, 
ultimately, through focusing on capitalizing on benefit they are also focusing on the other pole 
(protecting from harm) through that capitalization, indicating the inextricable duality.  
Second, within localizing we also see three linkages in relation to the risk object being 
constructed. The explicit trade-off between a strong linkage to harm (via maximising risk-
transfer) and a weak linkage to benefit (via minimizing retention). However, our findings again 
highlight a third outcome linkage. Constructing the risk object, via localizing, as primarily a 
source of harm is also indirectly a means of focusing on benefit. While risk-transfer is 
essentially a way to protect from harm, Risk-Protectors construct risk-transfer itself as a benefit 
(rather than a ‘harmful’ cost) that protects their balance-sheet and ultimately secures their 
solvency. As shown in Vignette 3 (Paragraph1), this construct an outcome linkage as Risk-
Protectors transfer more risk, not only to reduce the harm of big events, but also to allow them 
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to take on more risk and capitalize on the benefit of that. The linkages involved in the 
immediate trade-off between harm and benefit lead to a further outcome linkage where 
focusing on harm ultimately is a means of accessing benefit; the ability to underwrite more risk 
without negatively impacting their solvency.  
Our findings, supported by our analytic framework, show that the complex entanglement 
between harm and benefit involves constant decisions and adjustments between the opposing 
aspects of the duality. In all our organizations, no matter if they prioritized harm or benefit, or 
balanced the two, the practices enabled constant juxtaposing of each side of the harm-benefit 
duality in constructing and managing their portfolio as a risk object.  
Conclusion  
Contributions 
This paper answers the call for more research into the social construction of risk in organization 
theory generally (Scheytt et al., 2006, Hardy and Maguire, 2016, Gephart et al., 2009, Power, 
2014) and within the normal operations of organizations more specifically (Bourrier, 2002, 
Power, 2016, Maguire and Hardy, 2013). Our central contribution is therefore insight into the 
varied ways risk objects are constructed as a duality within these everyday risk management 
practices of organizations. Our framework develops understanding of the critical sensemaking 
processes (Fig.1, i-ii) through which organizations construct and manage risk objects 
(Hilgartner, 1992) as a harm-benefit duality [A] within their risk management practices [B]. 
This addresses an important omission as organizational scholarship has generally explored the 
social construction of risk as a source of harm (Hardy and Maguire, 2016), particularly in the 
context of disasters and accidents (Weick, 2010, Gephart, 1997, Roberts et al., 2007). While 
the need to navigate risk as a harm and benefit duality is prevalent in organizational life, it has 
been rarely studied (Power, 2016, Reason, 1997, Palermo et al., 2017, Hardy and Maguire, 
2016, Power, 2014). By contrast, we illuminate the centralizing, calculating, and diversifying 
practices that are associated with the social construction of risk as a duality. The resultant 
insights are important as all organizations, not only insurers and other financial organizations, 
produce and manage risk, necessitating the navigation of risk-taking and risk reduction. How 
they do so has implications for organizational sustainability as well as wider-societal dynamics 
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such as financial crises (Palermo et al., 2017, Power, 2004, Power, 2014). These everyday 
organizational risk management practices through which organizations juxtapose benefit and 
harm, without neglecting either pole, are thus hugely consequential (Bourrier, 2002).  
Our focus on how such normal operational practices construct the harm and benefit duality 
comprises an important contribution. We build from Palermo et al.’s (2017) single case study 
showing an organization’s efforts to shift its risk-taking culture, that was primarily oriented 
towards benefit, to greater attention to its associated harm. They recognize that harm and 
benefit “may have internal, co-formative relations between each other that deserve further 
exploration” (Palermo et al., 2017: 178). Drawing on Hilgarter’s (1992) framework, we extend 
their work to explain the nuances of these unfolding relations within organizations: 
highlighting the multiple linkages through which risk objects are constructed and managed as 
sources of harm-benefit. We explain how duality is constructed within weak and strong 
linkages between harm and benefit that enable organizations to not only prioritize one pole, but 
also not neglect the other. We also show that the trade-offs in these linkages between harm and 
benefit also support further outcome linkages that enable organizations to access benefit and 
reduce harm in ways that are germane to their particular sensemaking processes and 
organisational practices. Having broadly situated our main contribution within the existing 
literature, we now explain some specific ways our framework extends existing accounts of 
sensemaking about risk and managing dualities more broadly.  
Organizational sensemaking about risk. This research provides new insight by exploring 
the dynamic relationship between harm and benefit inherent in sensemaking about risk objects. 
We show that some organizations make sense of risk objects through abstracting while others 
do so through localising; and this plays out in the practices through which they prioritize 
respectively either benefit or harm in constructing the risk object. This framework of 
organizational sensemaking about risk as duality of harm-benefit contributes to the existing 
literature in two specific ways. First, such sensemaking explains how specific social 
constructions about risk as harm-benefit are simultaneously constituted by and constitutive of 
everyday risk management practices (see Weick, 1988, Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011). 
Abstracting and localizing as sensemaking processes construct the risk object in particular 
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ways, and those constructions prompt reinforcing cycles of high or low centralizing, 
calculating and diversifying risk management practices. These risk management practices are 
simultaneously the means through which those sensemaking processes unfold and what makes 
those specific constructions possible. Such abstracting and localising processes thus explain 
how the risk object construction is constituted by, and constitutive of the specific organizational 
risk management practices (Weick et al., 2005, Rouleau, 2005). Our framework thus extends 
existing studies that have largely emphasized the cognitive (e.g. Holt, 2004, Mitchell, 1995, 
Stein, 2000) or discursive (e.g. Tsoukas, 1999, Brown, 2000, Brown, 2004, Maguire and Hardy, 
2013) foundations of sensemaking about risk by showing that risk objects are made sense of 
within a reinforcing cycle of risk management practices. In doing so, we elaborate on, and 
further specify Hilgartner’s (1992) notion of an interplay between the construction and control 
(or management) of risk, showing how this plays out in the organizational practices (Power, 
2014). Abstracting and localizing are the sensemaking dynamics shaping both how 
organisations construct the duality inherent in the risk object within their management 
practices, and in turn those abstracted or localised constructions of risk enable and reinforce 
those practices.  
Second, our theorization of risk sensemaking as enacted within the normal risk management 
practices of organizations (Bourrier, 2002) extends existing episodic, crisis-oriented views of 
sensemaking about risk. The dominant focus in organisational risk research has led to a view 
that risk sensemaking is episodic or infrequent, specifically related to disaster or crisis events 
(Wicks, 2001, Kayes, 2004, Weick, 2010, Weick, 1993), and typically retrospective to 
understand the cause of harm or apportion blame after disasters have occurred (Topal, 2009, 
Gephart, 1993, Brown, 2000, Turner, 1976). Such studies have obscured the ‘everyday’ 
sensemaking about risk that organizations must do within their normal operations (e.g. 
Hutchins, 1995). Yet, as Maguire and Hardy (2013) note, risk must be normalized through 
organizing practices to enable continuity of activities. However, even their study that 
emphasizes these normalizing practices, focuses on episodic responses to defend the meaning 
of existing risk objects as risky or safe. We show that organizational constructions of risk are 
embedded in everyday risk management practices that shape and are shaped by the process of 
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sensemaking about the abstracted or localised nature of risk. Such sensemaking, which may be 
taken-for-granted by organizational participants, is nonetheless consequential. Our framework 
explains how even organizations in the same sector have widely varied understandings of 
benefit and harm that inform their business decisions about how to trade in risk. Future research 
might go further into this issue, extending our outcome linkage to analyse how everyday 
interpretations of risk and risk objects, embedded within risk management practices, shape 
variations in the business decisions. 
Dualities. Exploring the multiple linkages through which risk is constructed as a harm-
benefit duality also contributes to the literature on organizational dualities. First, our explicitly 
dualistic approach reconceives and extends the harm-benefit relationship within the literature 
on risk. The literature that conceptualizes risk as a source of harm and benefit has considered 
that more of one means less of the other (McLain and Jarrell, 2007, Reason, 1997). For 
instance, risk-aversion practices are traded off with profit-generating risk-taking; more of one 
is the antidote to too much of the other. Such approaches suggest an ideal balance that 
moderates between the two (e.g. Palermo et al., 2017). By contrast, we move from this either-
or depiction to a more complex ‘both-and’ relationship (Smith and Lewis, 2011), in which 
harm and benefit are not separate elements related only through a trade-off. Instead, such 
elements are always mutually constituted within the specific, multiple linkages being 
constructed (Hilgartner, 1992), in which prioritizing protection from harm is ultimately one 
means of attaining benefit and vice versa. Specifically, utilizing Hilgartner’s (1992) risk object 
framework focuses us on organizational constructions of multiple causal linkages to harm-
benefit. While some organizations construct a strong linkage between the risk object and one 
part of the duality and a weaker linkage to the other, our findings show that the dynamic is 
more complex than this initial trade-off suggests. These linkages spawn an additional 
‘outcome’ linkage in which prioritizing one element of the duality is ultimately also a means 
for attaining the other de-prioritized element. We thus move from considering risk and harm 
as two separate forces pulling the organization in different directions to viewing them as an 
interdependent whole or duality (Putnam et al, 2016); albeit one that unfolds in different ways 
in different organizations. How an organization navigates that interdependency is dependent 
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on how they construct those linkages as part of their sensemaking process around the risk 
object.  
Second, our insights have implications for the wider literature on how dualities are managed 
within organizations; a relatively nascent area of management research (Graetz and Smith, 
2008). This literature has shown that transcending, integrating, and balancing elements of a 
contradiction – like stability and change or exploitation and exploration – are critical 
organizational responses to dualities (Bednarek et al., 2017; Farjoun, 2010, Chen, 2002, 
Costanzo and Di Domenico, 2015, Putnam et al., 2016, Lewis, 2000). We indeed found that 
organizations can navigate the risk duality via balancing, reflecting this prevailing wisdom that 
balance between the oppositional ends of a duality enables organizational sustainability and 
peak performance (Smith, 2014, Smith and Lewis, 2011). However, our findings also show 
that dynamics that appear to privilege an imbalance can be an enabling way for organizations 
to navigate dualities, rather than being destructive as the existing literature suggests (Lewis, 
2000, Putnam et al., 2016). We therefore argue that successfully navigating dualities does not 
have to entail balance (Lewis, 2000, Putnam et al., 2016) or indeed efforts to transcend the 
existence of contradiction altogether (Farjoun, 2010). Rather, as our linkages show, explicit 
prioritization of one element of a duality can be considered a means of attaining the other. This 
novel approach to navigating dualities, in which the initial linkages that generate trade-offs 
between poles also spawn further linkages that potentially strengthen their interdependence, 
might be the basis for further research into organizational dualities.  
Future research and Boundary conditions 
This study examines important organizations that “operate or mark the frontier barrier” of 
societal response to risk (Beck, 1996: 31). Yet, despite their centrality to society, management 
scholars have rarely focused on insurance organizations, which have “typically been the ‘other’ 
of our known financial world” (Vargha, 2015: 2). Extending understanding of insurance 
organizations and risk-transfer is important (Jarzabkowski and Chalkias, 2018). We hope this 
is a spur to further theorizations of insurance and risk-taking in management research, 
including in banking where credit risk is transferred for financial benefit, often in complex 
ways that obscure the potential harm (Nijskens and Wagner, 2011, MacKenzie, 2011). Our 
25 
 
insights are also relevant to understanding risk within non-financial settings. The harm-benefit 
duality goes to the heart of understanding risk-taking in almost any organization that is required 
to calculate its risk (calculating), organize its decision-making (centralizing), and strategize 
about the diversification level in its activities and business portfolio (diversifying). Namely, the 
practices we identified are elements of organizing (e.g. Hendry, 1990) and strategizing (e.g. 
Lai et al., 2010) that are salient to many organizations, providing grounds for further research 
into the everyday practices of constructing and managing risk in other contexts. 
Future longitudinal research could explore how constructions of the risk duality and 
associated sensemaking processes change over time. Given the persistence of both sides of the 
duality, organizations are likely to shift along the continuum over time (Boholm and Corvellec, 
2011). Research could examine how abstracting and localizing shift over time, and in response 
to what stimuli, such as to internal change agents, or to the crises and disasters. Future research 
might also focus on political struggles over the control of risk objects within the risk 
management practices we have identified (Hilgartner, 1992). Whether decision-making about 
risk is centralized or decentralized is a question of who holds the power. Such struggles over 
the control of risk have been examined regarding environmental issues (Tsoukas, 1999) and 
public hearings (Topal, 2009), yet not to risk management within organizations. Finally, in 
contrast to existing literature that dismisses imbalance (Farjoun, 2010, Chen, 2002, Smith and 
Lewis, 2011, Putnam et al., 2016), we found that dualities can be managed by prioritizing one 
part of the duality. Hence, research should explore the variety of responses to dualities that 
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Centralizing Calculating Diversifying 
Risk 
Capitalizers 
1 3 / G  ● H H H 
2 1 / G  ● H H H 
3 1 / G  ● H H H 
4 1 / G  ● H H H 
5 4 / G  ● H H H 
6 2 / R  ● H H H 
7 1 / R ○ ● M H H 
8 2 / G ○ ● H M H 




10 1 / G ● ● M M M 
11 4 / R ● ● L H M 
12 5 / G ● ● M H L 
13 3 /R ● ● M M M 
14 3/ L ● ● M M M 
15 4 / R ● ● M M M 
16 3 / R ● ● M M M 
17 4 / R ● ● M H L 
18 3 / L ● ● L M H 






20 3 / R ● ○ M L L 
21 3 / G ● ○ M L L 
22 5 / R ● ○ L M L 
23 4 / G ● ○ M L L 
24 5 / L ● ○ M L L 
25 3 / G ●  L L L 
26 3 / G ●  L L L 
27 5 / L ●  L L L 
28 5 / L ●  L L L 
29 5 / L ●  L L L 
30 5 / L ●  L L L 
31 5 / L ●  L L L 
32 5 / R ●  L L L 
33 5 / R ●  L L L 
34 5 / L ●  L L L 
35 3 / R ●  L L L 
Size = revenue; firms put into 5 quadrants (1 = largest; 5 = smallest); 
Geographic span = global (G); regional (R) and local (L).  
• Strong o Weak  H = high; M = moderate; L = low 
                                                 
5 We clustered the organizations on three dominant patters based on the three organizational practices, as we explain in the methods section. 
(1) Risk-Capitalizers sought to capitalize on benefit via risk-retention through being high at least in two of centralizing, calculating, and 
diversifying (the dominant pattern being ‘high’ on all three). (2) Risk Balancers sought to balance harm and benefit via a degree of overall 
moderation in the three organizational practices. (3) Risk-Protectors sought protect from harm via risk-transfer through being low at least in 
two the three practices (the dominant pattern being ‘low’ on all three).  
6 To probe the variation, we examined organizations by their size and geographic scope, drawing from secondary data. However, these 
structural components only partially explained the observed variation (Table 1; column 3) as size and scope did not map against our clusters. 




Table 2. Managing risk as a duality: Capitalizing on Benefit (Figure 1, A1) and Protecting from Harm (A2) 
 
Representative data  
Risk-Balancers 
Balancing both ends 
of the duality 
- When we're evaluating our ROE, you know, the benefit comes into play quite a bit. But on the other side, it’s really just a question of 
keeping losses within sort of an expected range. (Org.12, Interview) 
- But there are many things. One obviously is the risk itself; the insurance company need to manage the risk and that's why they buy the 
reinsurance… but it’s also capital. I mean if you look at it, and obviously in the position of our firm the question is what is the advantage 
of taking the capital from someone at a cheap price and use ours to produce some other values. (Org.18, Interview) 
- I mean we look throughout the curve [different potential loss ratios], it’s all about making a profit, of course it is […] I can buy 
reinsurance to protect us to the one in 10... But if we do that will mean profit will drop through... We’ll spend too much money. So, 
reinsurance really will really help the volatility but further up the curve... (Org.15, Interview) 
- “[reinsurance] is absolutely both a capital management tool [capitalizing on benefit] and a volatility tool [protecting from 




- Take Japan, we don't have a nonlife unit in Japan as firm 2, right? But we can add some margins to our risk profile, so we can basically 
write Japanese business at zero capital cost. (Org.2, Interview)  
- So, we need have a return on equity and then we can say is this in a way cheaper to cede out or to keep the risk, and then in theory it 
could be cheaper in way to just say keep it because we have enough capital (Org.3, Interview)  
- We look at reinsurance as one of our largest expenses. And therefore, ask what I can do to make it more efficient [in order to buy less] 
(Org.2, Interview) 
- If you go back 10 years ago in Lloyds, when the market soften the first thing the underwriter does is buy down grubby reinsurance and 
burn his reinsurer’s and manager’s PNL that way. You know, our philosophy has changed really… If it’s within the 9%, we're budgeted 
for that and we don't really care. If we're getting reinsurance recoveries within the 9%, that means we’re inefficiency buying 
reinsurance. (Org1, Interview) 
- Since we started this reinsurance process in 2006, we've retained roughly 2 billion of profit which went in to the market on an 
aggregated basis over those five and a half years and around about €1 billion of revenue per year. And on a typical run rate about 200 
million of profitability is being retained each year in the group that was until 2006 being ceded. (Org1, Interview) 
Risk-Protectors 
Protecting from harm 
- The main objective for us is preservation of the capital that we have, so minimizing risk. (Org.22, Interview) 
- We don't mind paying more to get reinsurance backup, I mean a reinsurance cost is increased, we don't mind. (Org.30, Interview)  
- Natural disasters such as earthquakes can give rise to large insurance claims and the organization protects itself against such risk 
through reinsurance. Natural disasters of large-scale could happen as a result of unexpected weather linked to global warming and 
other factors. Business results can deteriorate if large insurance claims must be paid for such disasters. (Org.25, secondary data) 
- And I think on all our lines it’s certainly proportional; this allows us to transfer a bit more risk out. Because when you think about it 





Table 3. Abstracting (Figure 1, i) and localizing (ii)  
Abstracting: Harm distant and intangible (Risk-Capitalizers) Localizing: Harm proximate and tangible (Risk-Protectors) 
Distance from harm:  
- So we know what's happening in different parts of the world, we know how 
much business they have been writing or new business they're writing, what 
the peak up rate would be of expiring policies, what the combined ratio, the 
loss ratio would be on specific lines of business. So we get a lot of data 
directly but from top down we have a lot of insight as well what core strategic 
initiatives are taking place around the globe (Org.3, Interview)  
Proximity to harm: 
- We do write Afghanistan because we understand it very well. It’s our 
neighbour and we've been writing business since…I don't know how many 
years there (Org32, Interview) 
- These are what we call speciality crops or for some part permanent crops. 
Wine is usually always in the same place, so no crop rotation with vegetables 
(…) In Germany itself we have about twelve million hectares arable land. 
(Org.27, Interview) 
Intangibility of harm: 
- We run all these models [creating an abstract picture of the entire 
portfolio]… and then we buy reinsurance that picks up the worse of those 
events [but not more]. (Org.11, Interview) 
- All our risks are graded between 1 and 10; 1 being the best, 10 being 
bankruptcy. So, we have an average grade of the portfolio, that today it is 4.2, 
and we can see the evolution of this grade on a quarterly basis or a monthly 
basis. (Org.5, Interview) 
Tangibility of harm: 
- Ben highlights that with Directors and Officers Liability insurance the main 
concern in [Country A, the country where the organization is domiciled in] is 
to print holding companies, Bad things happened, and they lost a key holding 
account, and so they now look at them very, very carefully. (Org.31, 
Observation) 
- With motor risks the most expensive motor loss would be maybe say $1.5 
million, if you buy a Rolls Royce maybe. Most of the cars are in the range of 
$100K, maybe $2-300K if you're buying a Continental (Org.28, Interview 
Abstract view of portfolio: 
- So, the maths will tell you if you assume independence from natural events or 
any events, that the more groups of portfolios you put together the lower your 
cost of capital charge. (Org.6, Interview) 
- When you look at the group picture, you could just see underwriters buying 
huge amounts of unnecessary cover (Org.1, Interview) 
Multiple local understanding of specific harms: 
- We do all types of risk. We buy separate covers for each of them. We bundle 
up only the protections for the fire, the miscellaneous and the engineering by 
buying a property cover. And the marine cargo and the hull is combined 
marine general. Otherwise we buy separate programmes for everything. The 








Appendix 1: Coding Variation in Organizational practices 
 
This appendix gives more insight into the coding associated with the individual practices and the link between the three approaches to managing risk 
(Risk-Balancers, Risk-Capitalizers and Risk-Protectors) and the individual practices.  
 
B1 (Figure 1). Centralizing 
Below we include a representative data table of our coding of the three activities associated with centralizing and the variation between risk-balancers, 
risk-capitalizers and risk-protectors in that regard. Risk-Balancers were flexible in their approach; often being moderate in terms of centralizing. For 
example, authorising centrally for some types of risk but then giving underwriters authority and promoting flexibility for other risks. Risk-Capitalizers 
were consistently ‘high’ on centralizing. For instance, leaving ultimate decisions about risk-transfer to the CEO, monitoring risk-transfer centrally and 
consolidating accounts in one central balance sheet. By contrast, Risk-Protectors decentralized decision making, giving autonomy over the reinsurance 
spend and monitoring to individual underwriters or operating hubs and structuring their portfolio as separate local balance sheets, something which was 
associated with buying more reinsurance: “All lines of business, we buy separate covers for each of them. We don't bundle up.” (Org.33, Interview). 
Below we include a representative data table of our coding in this regard.  
 
Table 4. Representative data table: Variation in Centralizing  
Practices  Activities  
Risk-Capitalizers: consistently ‘high’ 
on the organizational practices  
Risk-Balancers: consistently ‘moderate’ 
on the organizational practices  
Risk-Protectors: consistently ‘low’ on 























High centralizing  
 
B1.1 Authorizing risk-transfer 
(centrally): 
Nobody should buy their reinsurance 
individually. We should do this as 
centralised as possible. If [local hubs] 
decide ‘that’s my cession,’ that does not 
mean this business is leaving the group, 




B1.1-2-3 Authorizing risk-transfer 
peripherally; monitoring risk-transfer 
centrally; and consolidating in one 
programme but with retaining balance sheet 
autonomy: We have a quite decentralised 
structure […] different companies, different 
names with different logos over [Region X] 
… This has certain limits. […] each 
company authorizes its own reinsurance 
programme and place it on the external 
Low centralizing 
 
B1.1 Authorizing risk-transfer on the 
periphery (underwriter autonomy 
privileged): [The reason for reporting to 
the underwriting head, not the CFO] is 
that you need more underwriting 
knowledge rather than the financial 
knowledge. (Org.34, Interview) 
 
B1.2 Monitoring risk-transfer 
















B1.2 Monitor risk-transfer (centrally):     
So, they send out the data requests in this 
predetermined format, and once we have 
the data and have done some plausibility 
checks and testing, then it goes in to the 
data warehouse. (Org.3, Interview) 
 
B1.3 Consolidating accounts (in one 
central balance sheet): We centralise 
capital with one big European account 
[…] we have a consolidated balance 
sheet and we should manage our risks 
with that as the driving force behind risk-
transfer (Org.3, Interview) 
market as they think it’s suitable for their 
balance sheet. But, we have developed 
certain rules, guidelines and so. There is 
also another limitation, the so-called group 
programme, […] So it is a mixture. It is a 
still de-centralised, it is still their 
responsibility for net result and reinsurance 
but with certain limitations. […] trust must 
be there otherwise a totally centralised 
organisation must take place. (Org.13, 
Interview) 
underwriters’ level): We don’t use any 
central process to audit it [risk-transfer 
decision]. I let my underwriter to 
decide. (Org.30, Interview) 
 
B1.3 Low consolidating (thinking the 
portfolio as separate bundles with 
separate local balance sheets): Jack 
argues that they decided not to 
integrate. “they [sub-units] work as a 
second company.” (Org.31, 
Observation) 
 
B2. Calculating  
Below we include a representative data table of our coding of the two activities associated with calculating and the variation between risk-balancers, 
risk-capitalizers and risk-protectors in that regard. Risk-Balancers often exhibited a moderate approach to models. For instance, using models but also 
being sceptical and therefore restrained in their use in certain areas. Risk-Capitalizers were consistently high on calculating, exhibiting a strong reliance 
on models and data, which provided confidence to retain more risk: “We could demonstrate these are all the modelled outputs; here's what the exposure 
looks like. This is why you don't need to worry about it [protection]” (Org.1, Interview). Risk-Protectors were low on calculating, relying on managerial 
judgement to underpin the risk-transfer process rather than models as shown by our representative data table below.  
 
Table 4 (continued). Representative data table: Variation in Centralizing  
Practices  Activities  
Risk-Capitalizers: consistently ‘high’ on 
the organizational practices  
Risk-Balancers: consistently ‘moderate’ 
on the organizational practices  
Risk-Protectors: consistently ‘low’ on 




















B2.1 Using models to make decisions: 
We have an analytics team doing nothing 
else than really running our Group 
[internally developed] model to 
Moderate calculating 
 
B2.1 Using models cautiously: I keep 
seeing unmodelled events…If you're buying 
in New Zealand, it was a surprise event... 
[But] we collate data on the risk profile, we 
Low calculating 
 
B2.1 Using judgement (rather than 
models): We do onsite inspections to 
determine what fire risk is, what wind 














determine by peril region, what the 
exposure will be […] You need to have a 
certain level of capabilities in putting the 
global set of data in to a modelling 
engine. (Org.3, Interview) 
 
B2.2 Assessing information quality for 
models as high: We have a huge database 
with information on each and every risk 
[…] 40 million companies… Everything 
is possible because we have the database, 
we have all this information that we will 
discuss tomorrow in the risk 
underwriting committee. (Org. 5, 
Interview) 
work with brokers who will develop various 
options. Our own actuaries and 
underwriters will then validate their 
assumptions and make sure that that 
modelling is consistent with how we see the 
risks (Org.8, Interview) 
 
B2.2 Assessing information quality for 
models as moderate: We have this great 
database… [But] sometimes you don't have 
the information. We are making all of our 
decisions on the 2009 [previous year] 
accounts where all the economics were just 
like that… (Org.9, Interview) 
do not depend on the model to say 
here's what our exposure is, we know 
from our engineering report and the 
onsite visit. (Org.21, Interview) 
 
 
B2.2 Assessing information quality for 
models as low: Email to client: we are 
disappointed that the data quality 
presented has deteriorated year on year 
[…] In reality we should come off this 
cover, but we are willing to give some 
credit and hope that data quality 
improves (Org.25, Observation)  
 
B3. Diversifying 
Below we include a representative data table of our coding of the two activities associated with diversifying and the variation between risk-balancers, 
risk-capitalizers and risk-protectors in that regard. Risk-Balancers were flexible in their approach to these dimensions; often showing moderate 
diversification. Risk-Capitalizers were consistently high on diversifying; evaluating their portfolio on its combination of non-correlated risks and 
increasing diversification by adding more non-correlated risk. By contrast, Risk-Protectors did not value diversification of the portfolio highly, given 
that risk is unpredictable and can be, if not correlated, at least coincidental; such as the occurrence of earthquakes in Japan and floods in Thailand in the 
same year. They therefore considered that deep knowledge of the context of each risk was better than seeking further diversification.  
 
Table 4 (continued). Representative data table: Variation in Centralizing  
Practices  Activities  
Risk-Capitalizers: consistently ‘high’ on 
the organizational practices  
Risk-Balancers: consistently ‘moderate’ 
on the organizational practices  
Risk-Protectors: consistently ‘low’ on 




















B3.1 Incorporating diversification 
benefits in portfolio evaluations: Our cost 
of capital is less because we've got more 
diversification credit. It’s unlikely that 
Moderate diversifying  
 
B3.1 Incorporating diversification benefits 
to a moderate degree in portfolio 
evaluation: If you're spending a lot of 
diversifying income on protecting that little 
Low diversifying  
 
B3.1-2 Not incorporating diversification 
in portfolio evaluations or focusing on 
trying to increase diversification: We 











the motor portfolio would go wrong 
together with a Japanese quake. (Org.4, 
Interview) 
 
B3.2 Growing diversification (new 
business): Jeff added that they write 
additional global business to add 
diversification value to the company. 
Furthermore, they are also moving into 
manufacturing. (Org.3, Observation) 
We’re happy in this kind of risk because 
we understand it’s completely not 
correlated to any kind of other risk we 
have (Org.9, Interview)  
piece of income, you're actually taking the 
diversifying income out of the group […] 
but we’ve looked to buy an aggregate cover 
sideways for some territories. (Org.11, 
Interview) 
 
B3.2 Growing diversification cautiously: 
There are instances where we probably 
overspend and instances where the 
programme has no capital benefit for the 
group. Also, if you're spending a lot of what 
we call diversifying income on protecting 
that little piece of income, you're taking the 
diversifying income out of the group and 
the diversifying exposure. (Org.11, 
Interview)  
company in [Geography1]. We only 
underwrite big and mega risk. We don't 
do small to medium, we don't do weak 
players, we are concentrated (Org.30, 
Interview)  
 
In Singapore, as far as Cat risk is 
concerned our concern is restricted to a 
bit of localised flooding, that’s about all 
I think about. (Org.29, Interview) 
 
Diversification doesn't at all contribute 
much in the plan to reduce risk. 
(Org.25, Interview) 
 
 
 
